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the effect of a procedural rule of law which eliminates the issue of sanity
from the criminal proceeding until raised by the defendant. To this
extent, Gerade and Iacobino have been overruled.
The present case also produces evidence of a significant trend which
has not yet attained the majority status of the court. Two of the Justices
of the court have expressed the opinion that insanity should no longer
be treated as a defense. Instead, sanity should be regarded as an element
of the crime, with the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt, resting with the commonwealth.
And, finally, mention must be made of what can only be described as
a speculative trend regarding future opinions of Justice Roberts concerning the appropriate test for insanity. It would appear, from his
opinion in the Vogel case, as well as his opinions in such related decisions as Ahearn, that his future opinions will be in the vanguard of
those which attack the M'Naghten test as an antiquated relic of the
dark ages.
Ronald C. Mokowski

LABOR LAW-FEERAL COURTS-LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,

1947-SUITS

§ 301(a)

NoSTRIKE AGREEMENT-The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that a federal court may enjoin a strike which violates the no-strike
provision of a collective bargaining agreement if that agreement contains a mandatory grievance-arbitration procedure.
UNDER

TO ENJOIN STRIKES IN BREACH OF A

Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970).
In the Boys Market case, the Supreme Court of the United States once
again considered the effect of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act1 on an
1. Section 4 provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute or prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute,
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action brought in federal court under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 19472 to enjoin a strike which violates the no-strike
clause of a labor contract.
A collective bargaining agreement between Local 770 of the Retail
Clerk's Union and the Boys Markets, Inc. provided, inter alia, that there
would be no strikes and that disputes involving the interpretation or
application of their agreement could be processed through a grievance
and arbitration procedure, both parties being bound by any determination there reached.3 Nevertheless, during the term of that agreement
the union engaged in a strike and picketed the employer over a grievwhether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests
in a labor dispute;
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence
Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 4, 29 U.S.C.A. § 104
the acts heretofore specified ....
(1965).
2. Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft Hartley Act), § 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) (1965).
3. For resolving grievances, the parties' written agreement provided:
ARTICLE XIV
ADJUSTMENT AND ARBITRATION
A. CONTROVERSY, DISPUTE OR DISAGREEMENT.
Any and all matters of controversy, dispute or disagreement of any kind or
character existing between the parties and arising out of or in any way involving the interpretation or application of the terms of this Agreement . . . shall
be settled and resolved by the procedures and in the manner hereinafter set
forth.
B. ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE.
C.

D.

ARBITRATION.
1. Any matter not satisfactorily settled or resolved in Paragraph B hereinabove
shall be submitted to arbitration for final determination upon written demand of either party....
4. The arbitrator or board of arbitration shall be empowered to hear and determine the matter in question and the determination shall be final and binding upon the parties, subject only to their rights under law....
POWERS, LIMITATIONS AND RESERVATIONS.
2. Work Stoppages. Matters subject to the procedures of this Article shall be
settled and resolved in the manner provided herein. During the term of this
Agreement, there shall be no cessation or stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing or boycotts, except that this limitation shall not be binding upon either
party hereto if the other party refuses to perform any obligation under this
Article or refuses or fails to abide by, accept or perform a decision or award
of an arbitrator or board.
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ance concerning the alleged performance of bargaining unit work by
excluded personnel, notwithstanding the employer's offer to submit
the dispute to arbitration.
Boys Markets, Inc. obtained a temporary restraining order against
the strike from the state court and an order for the union to show
cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted. Thereupon,
the union removed the case to federal district court and made a motion
to quash the state court's temporary restraining order. The district
court found that the grievance was arbitrable under the parties' written
agreement and, consequently, ordered arbitration of the underlying
dispute and enjoined the strike and picketing. The union appealed.
4
Considering the case controlled by Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,
in which the Supreme Court, seven years previously, held that the antiinjunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevent a federal
court from enjoining such a strike, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the lower court's grant of injunctive relief. 5 The Boys
Markets, Inc. appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States which
granted certiorari," taking a welcomed opportunity to reexamine the
7
Sinclair holding.
Concluding that Sinclair had been erroneously decided in 1962 and
that subsequent events had undermined its validity, a 5-2 majority8 of
the Court overruled that decision and reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals. It held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not preclude a § 301 injunction by a federal court to enforce a no-strike clause
of a labor agreement if that agreement contains a mandatory grievance
adjustment or arbitration procedure. The Court, however, was unwilling to make this remedy available without qualification. For the guid4. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
5. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 416 F.2d 368 (1969), rev'd,
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
6. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 396 U.S. 1000 (1970).
7. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Harlan and Brennan, concurring in Avco Corp.
v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
390 U.S. 557, 562 (1968), expressed the view that "the Court expressly reserves decision on
the effect of Sinclair in the circumstances presented by this case. The Court will, no
doubt, have an opportunity to reconsider the scope and continuing validity of Sinclair
upon an appropriate future occasion." Boys Markets provided that "appropriate future
occasion."
8. Justice Brennan, who wrote the dissent in Sinclair, wrote for the majority in Boys
Markets. Justices Douglas and Harlan, who also dissented in Sinclair, along with Justice
Stewart (who, in a separate concurring opinion, apologized for his majority role in
Sinclair) and Chief Justice Berger joined Justice Brennan to make the majority. The
dissent was written by Justice Black, who wrote for the majority in Sinclair. He was
joined by Justice White who also voted with the majority in Sinclair. Justice Frankfurter
took no part in the Boys Markets decision.
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ance of district courts in determining whether to grant injunctive relief,
the principles set forth in the dissenting opinion of Sinclair were
adopted, i.e., there can be no injunctive relief unless the case is one in
which an injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia
Act; both parties must be contractually bound under the labor agreement to arbitrate the grievance which gave rise to the strike; as a
condition precedent to obtaining an injunction, the employer should
be ordered to arbitrate the dispute; and the issuance of an injunction
must be warranted under the ordinary principles of equity.
Prior to the Sinclair case, the Supreme Court had not been squarely
faced with the question of whether § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
prevented federal courts from granting injunctions, under § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, against strikes over arbitrable grievances. However, in a number of pre-Sinclair cases, it had worked out
"accommodations" with the Norris-LaGuardia Act so as to permit
federal court injunctions under the Railway Labor Act9 against strikes
over arbitrable grievances, 10 under the National Labor Relations Act
over racial discrimination, 1 and even under § 301 of that Act to enforce
12
agreements to arbitrate.
In suits praying for enforcement of arbitration clauses, § 301 was
given a broad interpretation by the Court. The first major decision in
this area was Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills"a
where a union brought a § 301 action in federal court for the specific
performance of an arbitration clause. The Supreme Court, declaring
that such a provision could be specifically enforced by mandatory
injunction, espoused the now famous quid pro quo doctrine that an
agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the necessary corollary of
an agreement not to strike. In addition to holding that § 301 created a
federal substantive right to enforce a collective agreement, the majority
also concluded that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not prevent the exercise of jurisdiction specifically to
enforce the arbitration clause of an agreement.
9. The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et. seq. (1954), originally enacted in
1926, is designed to protect the right of self-organization and to promote collective bargaining and other devices for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes in "carrier" industries
which are subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.
10. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co.,
353 U.S. 30 (1957).
11. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Syres v. Oil
Workers International Union, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892
(1955).
12. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 US. 448 (1957).

13. Id.
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The Lincoln Mills case was fortified in 1960 when the Court decided
14
three separate cases, collectively referred to as the Steelworker trilogy,
wherein repeated references were made to the quid pro quo existing
between a no-strike clause and an arbitration clause in a labor contract.
An even further extension was made in Local 174, Teamsters, Chauf15
feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour Company
where the Courts said that a pledge not to strike over a grievance may
properly be implied from an express agreement in the contract to
arbitrate such a dispute.
When the Sinclair case presented the Supreme Court with an occasion to make the next logical extension to these cases, it refused and
was unwilling to make any further "accommodations" with the NorrisLaGuardia Act. By a 5-3 bench, the Court affirmed the dismissal of an
employer suit for an injunction against a work stoppage in violation of
a no-strike pledge, where the issues which caused the strike were arbitrable under the terms of the parties' collective agreement. The majority
determined the matter to be a "labor dispute" within the scope of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and, therefore, protected from federal court
injunction by § 4. Mr. Justice Black held that while it was congressional
policy to encourage the resolution of labor disputes through arbitration
rather than economic warfare, the Congress did not intend to go so far
with that policy as to repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act when § 301 was
enacted. This, he said, was clear from the language of that section as
well as its legislative history.16
The Sinclair decision was followed by much scholarly criticism 17 as
well as a plea by the American Bar Association for Congress to modify
13
§ 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to abate the consequences of Sinclair.
14. United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574

(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).

15. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
16. But see Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 292, 331-33
(1963), which submits that a review of the legislative history of § 301 lends little help
with respect to the interplay between § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act.
17. See Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, id.; Aaron, Strikes in Breach of
Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 COL. L. REV. 1027 (1963); Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair
v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547 (1963); Dannett, Norris-LaGuardia and Injunctions in
Labor Arbitration Cases, 16 N.Y.U. CONFERENCE OF LABOR 275 (1963); The Supreme Court,
1961 Term, 76 HAsv. L. REV. 54 (1962); A Survey of Labor Remedies, 54 VA. L. REv. 38
(1968).
18. "[Ihe American Bar Association recommends that the Congress enact a modifica-
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Basically, the disenchantment with the case had been the inequity

fostered by it. On the one hand, the court held, beginning with Lincoln
Mills, that an employer's agreement to arbitrate disputes is specifically
enforceable because it is the quid pro quo for the union's pledge not to
strike. But on the other hand, in Sinclair the union's agreement not to
strike was insulated from federal court injunction by § 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act and, consequently, not specifically enforceable. Thus,
the Supreme Court, over a period of some five years between the
Lincoln Mills case and the Sinclair case granted unions their quid but
denied employers their pro quo.19
Prior to Sinclair, the Court held that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts over suits to enforce labor contracts20
but must apply the law developed by the federal courts because the
"dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles
of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the

statute."' 21 Therefore, the immediate effect of Sinclair was to deny employers a federal forum in § 301 cases where they prayed for injunctive
relief against strikes in violation of no-strike agreements and thus restricted them to bringing such suits in state courts.22
In 1968, however, the effectiveness of the state forum was substantially diluted by the Supreme Court's determination in Avco Corp. v.
Aero Lodge No. 735, InternationalAssociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers28 and the need to reconsider the Sinclair case was made
even more apparent. A unanimous Court held in Avco that a union
could remove a § 301 suit, originally brought in a state court, to a
federal district court. After that decision, legal writers once again took
up the attack on Sinclair, pointing out the inconsistency of the net
tion to Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to permit the issuance of a restraining
order, temporary or permanent injunction by a court of the United States in any action
brought therein pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, as amended, for the purpose of filling the inequitable gap which exists in the law
relating to the mutual enforcement of collective bargaining agreements as provided by
the congress under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as
amended, provided that such modification shall require that no injunction against the
strike shall be permissible in the absence of notice and hearing." Reprinted in J. Williams, Labor Relations and the Law, 888 (3d ed., 1965).
19. See Unkovic, Enforcing the No-Strike Clause, 21 LAB. L. J. 387 (1970).
20. Charles Dowd Box Co. v' Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
21. Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Lucas
Flour Co., 396 U.S. 95 (1962).
22. See Edwards and Bergman, The Legal and Practical Remedies Available to Employers to Enforce a Contractual "No-Strike" Commitment, 21 LAB. L. J. 3, 13 (1970).

23. 390 U.s. 557 (1968).
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result of the two cases with the congressional purpose and intent of
§ 301.24 The majority in Boys Markets was also quick to recognize the
undesirable practical operation of Avco with Sinclair. The court stated:
the decision in Avco, viewed in the context of Lincoln Mills and
its progeny, has produced an anomalous situation which, in our
view, makes urgent the reconsideration of Sinclair. The principal
practical effect of Avco and Sinclair taken together is nothing less
than to oust state courts of jurisdiction in § 301(a) suits where injunctive relief is sought for breach of a no-strike obligation. Union
defendants can, as a matter of course, obtain removal to a federal
court, and there is obviously a compelling incentive for them to
do so in order to gain the advantage of the strictures upon injunctive relief which Sinclair imposes on federal courts. The sanctioning of this practice, however, is wholly inconsistent with our conclusion in Dowd Box that the congressional purpose embodied in
§ 301(a) was to supplement, and not to encroach upon the preexisting jurisdiction of the state courts. It is ironic indeed that the
very provision which Congress clearly intended to provide additional remedies for breach of collective bargaining agreements has
been employed to displace previously existing state remedies. We
are not at liberty thus to depart from clearly expressed congressional policy to the contrary.
*

.

. the very purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide a

mechanism for the expeditious settlements of industrial disputes
without resort to strikes, lock-outs, or other self-help measures.
This basic purpose is obviously largely undercut if there is no
immediate, effective remedy for those very tactics which arbitration is designed to obviate. Thus because Sinclair, in the aftermath
of Avco, casts serious doubt upon the effective enforcement of a
vital element of stable labor-management relations-arbitration
agreements with the attendant no-strike obligations-we conclude
that Sinclair
does not make a viable contribution to federal labor
25
policy.

Clearly, the Sinclaircase was erroneously decided, and its reconsideration, particularly after Avco, was compelled. It is submitted, however,
24. See Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions Against Breaches of No-Strike Agreements
in Labor Contracts, 21 ALBANY L. REV. 303 (1968); Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301:
The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia Marine on the Fabric of National Labor
Policy, 69 COL. L. REV. 980 (1969); Danau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA.
L. REv. 427 (1969); Wellington, The No-Strike Clause and the Labor Injunction: Time
for a Re-Examination, 30 U. Pir. L. REV. 293 (1968); Bakaly Jr. & Pepe, And After Avco,
20 LAB. L.J. 67 (1969); Edwards and Bergman, supra note 22.
25. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 244-245, 249.
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that a mere overruling of that case does not satisfy the congressional
commitment to labor peace and optimum stability in labor relations
expressed by the Labor Management Relations Act.
In virtually every business in the United States today, collective bargaining is an arm's length process. Indeed, the day of the sweat-shop,
when concerted labor activity was unprotected and management's overwhelming economic power was without effective counterbalance, is
long gone. Labor and management each represent a substantial force
in our contemporary society and labor's bargaining position is eminently stronger than management's in many important respects. A collective agreement, reached as a result of negotiations between labor
and management, represents a contribution by each toward labor peace
for the term of that agreement, and should be enforceable, in toto,
under § 301 to encourage future good faith bargaining and to avoid
unchecked economic warfare during the prescribed period of the contract.
The only real promise a union can give in return for the many promises in labor agreement is the one promise that it will provide its services during a certain term, or, conversely, that it will not withdraw its
services during the same period. It is the one thing a union has to exchange and the sole assurance for which an employer bargains. A nostrike commitment should, therefore, be implicit in a valid labor agreement for it is the only consideration which can afford the mutuality inherent in any bilateral contract. Similarly, the promise not to strike
must not be a phantom-it must be fully enforceable whether or not
it emerges from an agreement which also contains an arbitration clause.
Any no-strike pledge, express or implied, should be treated as unequivocal (unless expressly modified or deleted by the parties in their
written agreement), effective and conclusive on the union for the term
of the agreement in the same manner as the obligation of the employer
to pay for the services of the members of the bargaining unit. This result does not place any undue hardship on a union. The Labor Management Relations Act and the law of contracts can afford labor and
management sufcient protection for their respective legal and bargained-for rights. While a negotiated grievance-arbitration procedure
is perhaps administratively more convenient than a court of law for the
redress of grievances, its remedy power is no greater. It is the choice of
the negotiating parties which determines the method by which disputes
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are to be resolved under their collective agreement. However, this
choice should not affect other rights and obligations created by the
same agreement, including the union's express or implied promise not
to strike. Indeed, if a pledge not to strike is unenforceable at law, there
can be no effective bargaining for labor peace.
Richard I. Thomas

336

